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Experiments	in	Experience:	Aligning	Design	Inquiry	with	John	Dewey’s	
Pragmatism			According	to	Richard	Buchanan,	three	broad	strategies	of	design	research	can	be	seen	to	have	emerged	in	the	twentieth	century.	These	include	the	dialectic,	design	science	and	design	inquiry.1	Within	the	dialectic,	design	is	examined	from	a	social	and	cultural	perspective.	In	contrast,	design	science—as	formulated	by	Herbert	Simon2—aims	to	analyse	and	identify	the	underlying	elements	and	mechanisms	of	the	design	process.	Lastly,	design	inquiry	pursues	two	closely	related	lines	of	investigation,	focusing	on	either	the	creative	power	of	the	designer	or	the	discipline	of	making.		While	design	science	dominated	from	the	1970s	through	to	the	early	1990s,	recent	decades	have	seen	a	shift	towards	the	strategy	of	design	inquiry.	This	reorientation	can,	in	part,	be	attributed	to	the	perceived	failure	of	design	science	to	adequately	address	newly	emergent	problems	within	the	field.3	Perhaps	more	significantly,	however,	the	academization	of	design	has	resulted	in	new	communities	of	design	research.	In	countries	such	as	the	UK	and	Australia,	for	example,	the	incorporation	of	art	and	design	institutions	within	the	university	system	has	led	to	demands	for	practice-orientated	faculty	to	become	research	active	and	theoretical	engaged.4	Concurrently,	across	the	globe,	the	provision	of	
																																																								1	See	Richard	Buchanan,	“Thinking	About	Design:	An	Historical	Perspective,”	in	Philosophy	of	Technology	and	Engineering	
Sciences,	Vol.	9,	Anthonie	Meijers	ed.	(Amsterdam,	NH:	Elsevier,	2009):	409-453;	and	Richard	Buchanan,	“Strategies	of	Design	Research:	Productive	Science	and	Rhetorical	Inquiry,”	in	Design	Research	Now,	Ralf	Michel	ed.	(Basel:	Birkhäuser-Verlag,	2007):	55-66.		2	Herbert	Simon,	The	Sciences	of	the	Artificial	(Cambridge	MA:	MIT	Press,	1969).	3	Buchanan,	“Strategies	of	Design	Research:	Productive	Science	and	Rhetorical	Inquiry”:	58.		4	Gavin	Melles,	“An	Enlarged	Pragmatist	Inquiry	Paradigm	for	Methodological	Pluralism	in	Academic	Design	Research,”	
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doctoral	education	in	design	has	expanded	rapidly,5	with	many	students	looking	to	incorporate	design	practice	within	their	research	projects.6		Over	the	last	two	decades,	these	latter	developments	have	given	rise	to	a	vast	literature	questioning	the	relationship	between	practice	and	research,7	as	well	as	the	validity	of	‘practice-based’	contributions	to	knowledge.8	Gradually,	initial	confusion9	has	given	way	to	efforts	aimed	at	a	methodological	formalization	of	design	inquiries	undertaken	within	academic	contexts.	Here,	some	have	considered	the	extent	to	which	‘experiential’	factors	can	be	seen	to	legitimately	inform	the	research	process	and	its	outcomes,10	while	others	have	sought	to	reposition	the	tools	of	conventional	research	as	directive	aids	for	design-based	knowledge	production.11		Though	many	of	these	contributions	offer	viable	conceptualizations	of	design	practice	as	a	method,	discussions	relating	to	the	epistemological	frameworks	or	concerns	underpinning	them	have	been	relatively	limited.	In	place	of	epistemology,	attempts	have	been	made	to	characterize	design	research	as,	at																																																									5	Victor	Margolin,	“Doctoral	Education	in	Design:	Problems	and	Prospects,”	Design	Issues	26:3	(2010):	70.	6	Owain	Pedgley	and	Paul	Wormald	“Integration	of	Design	Projects	within	a	Ph.D.,”	Design	Issues	23:3	(2007):	70-85.	7	See,	for	example,	Richard	Buchanan,	Dennis	Doordan,	Lorraine	Justice,	and	Victor	Margolin,	eds.	Doctoral	Education	in	
Design	1998:	Proceedings	of	the	Ohio	Conference,	October	8–11,	1998	(Pittsburgh:	The	School	of	Design,	Carnegie	Mellon	University,	1999);	Nigel	Cross,	“Design	Research:	A	Disciplined	Conversation,”	Design	Issues	15:2	(1999):	5-10;	and	Ken	Friedman	“Theory	Construction	in	Design	Research:	Criteria,	Approaches	and	Methods,”	Design	Studies	24:6	(2003):	507-522.	8	See,	for	example,	Bruce	Archer,	‘The	Nature	of	Research,”	Co-Design	Journal	2:11	(1995):	6-13;	Michael	Biggs,	“The	Role	of	the	Artefact	in	Art	and	Design	Research”	International	Journal	of	Design	Sciences	and	Technology	10:2	(2002):	19–24;	and	Stephen	Scrivener,	“Characterising	Creative-Production	Doctoral	Projects	in	Art	and	Design,”	International	Journal	of	
Design	Sciences	and	Technology	10:2	(2002):	25–44.	9	For	a	brief	overview	of	the	confusion	surrounding	understandings	of	practice-based	design	research	arising	in	relation	to	the	UK’s	1996	Research	Assessment	Exercise,	see	Carole	Gray	and	Julian	Malins,	Visualizing	Research:	A	Guide	to	the	
Research	Process	in	Art	and	Design	(London:	Routledge,	2016):	3-4.	Further	discussion,	relating	to	practice-based	PhDs	in	particular	can	be	found	in	Owain	Pedgley	and	Paul	Wormald	“Integration	of	Design	Projects	within	a	Ph.D.”		10	See,	for	example,	Michael	Biggs,	“Learning	from	Experience:	Approaches	to	the	Experiential	Component	of	Practice-Based	Research,”	in	Forskning-	Reflektion-Utveckling	[Research-Reflection-Development],	Henrik	Karlsson	ed.	(Stockholm:	Swedish	Research	Council,	2004):	6–21;	Maarit	Mäkelä	“Knowing	Through	Making:	The	Role	of	the	Artefact	in	Practice-Led	Research,”	Knowledge,	Technology	&	Policy	20:3	(2007):	157-163;	and	Kristina	Niedderer,	“Explorative	Materiality	and	Knowledge.	The	Role	of	Creative	Exploration	and	Artefacts	in	Design	Research,”	Form	Akademisk-
Research	Journal	of	Design	and	Design	Education	6:2	(2013):	1-20.	11	See,	for	example,	Eva	Brandt	and	Thomas	Binder,	"Experimental	Design	Research:	Genealogy,	Intervention,	Argument,"	(paper	presented	at	the	conference	of	the	International	Association	of	Societies	of	Design	Research,	Hong	Kong,	12-15,	2007);	John	Zimmerman	and	Jodi	Forlizzi,	“The	Role	of	Design	Artifacts	in	Design	Theory	Construction,”	Artifact	2:1	(2008):	41-45;	Ilpo	Koskinen,	John	Zimmerman,	Thomas	Binder,	Johan	Redström,	and	Stephan	Wensveen,	Design	
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times,	necessarily	tacit.12	Beyond	this,	another	manoeuvre	positions	the	design	research	program	as	the	‘frame	and	foundation’	of	research	that	incorporates	design	practice;13	furnishing	activities	with	a	core	belief	system,	as	well	as	a	set	of	theoretical	commitments	that	link	the	work	to	deeper	strands	within	philosophy.14		While	such	proposals	undoubtedly	hold	appeal,	the	general	absence	of	an	explicit,	widely	shared	epistemological	narrative	dedicated	to	the	incorporation	of	design	practice	within	research	is	problematic.	It	points	to	evasion,	suggesting	that	such	an	approach	is	not	seen	to	require	justification.	At	the	same	time,	it	also	limits	the	potential	for	development	and	is,	ultimately,	regrettable.	In	seeking	to	address	this	gap,	a	number	of	epistemological	pairings	might	be	advanced.	For	example,	plausible	alignment	could	be	drawn	with	Nigel	Cross’s	theory	of	‘designerly	ways	of	knowing’15	or,	equally,	with	more	general	perspectives	on	design	thinking.16	However,	given	the	popular	focus	on	notions	of	the	experimental,	Donald	Schön’s	concept	of	knowledge-in-practice17	can	arguably	be	seen	to	provide	one	of	the	clearest	articulations	of	an	epistemology	of	design	inquiry	yet	published.	Above	all,	his	positioning	of	reflection	in	and	on	action	as	a	form	of	inquiry	lends	ready	support	to	the	view	that	design	practice	can	be	central	to	the	conduct	of	research.18	Indeed,	Schön	is	already	widely	
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Designers	Think:	The	Design	Process	Demystified	(London:	Routledge,	2006).	17	Donald	Schön,	The	Reflective	Practitioner	(New	York:	Basic	Books,	1983):	69.		18	According	to	Schön,	in	order	resolve	problematic	situations	professional	practitioners	will	conduct	live,	practical	experiments	with	a	view	to	understanding	and	changing	the	situation.	Underpinning	this	experimental	process	is	the	professional’s	ability	to	reflect	in	and	on	action.	Amongst	other	functions,	reflection	is	seen	to	allow	for	the	formulation	of	
referenced	in	design	research	literature	concerned	with	exploring	practice-research	relationships.19	This	apparent	alignment	points,	in	turn,	to	another,	deeper	alignment.	Namely,	to	the	connection	between	Schön	and	the	Pragmatist	philosopher	John	Dewey,	whose	theory	of	inquiry	inspired	the	underlying	structure	of	Schön’s	approach.20	Though	design	scholars	tend	to	pay	comparatively	less	attention	to	Dewey’s	work,	his	aesthetics	and	pedagogy	can	be	seen	to	have	had	a	direct	and	profound	influence	on	the	broader	field	of	design.	This	is	perhaps	most	immediately	evident	in	the	context	of	design	education.	Here,	Dewey’s	connections	with	László	Moholy-Nagy21	and	John	Andrew	Rice	led	to	an	involvement	in	the	establishment	of	both	the	New	Bauhaus22	in	Chicago	and	North	Carolina’s	Black	Mountain	College.23	By	the	time	the	New	Bauhaus	became	the	Institute	of	Design,	Art	as	Experience	(1934)	was	required	reading	in	the	product	design	workshop.2425	Latterly,	the	book’s	chapter	“Having	an	Experience”	informed	the	incorporation	of	design	thinking	within	HCI	work	at	the	Palo	Alto	Research	Centre	and,	subsequently,	went	on	to	become	a	foundational	text	within	the	discipline.26	This	influence	has	continued	up	to	the	
																																																																																																																																																														hypotheses,	as	well	as	the	evaluation	of	the	result.	Over	time,	the	accumulative	application	of	reflection	is	seen	to	take	the	form	of	an	extended	‘reflective	inquiry’,	thus	redefining	practice	as	an	active	research	process.	19	See,	for	example,	his	extensive	citation	throughout	Michel	ed.,	Design	Research	Now.	20	Schön,	The	Reflective	Practitioner,	357.	Also	see	Donald	Schön,	“The	Theory	of	Inquiry:	Dewey's	Legacy	to	Education,”	
Curriculum	Inquiry,	22:2	(1992):	119-139.		21	See,	Mary	Jane	Jacob	and	Jacquelynn	Baas,	eds.	Chicago	Makes	Modern:	How	Creative	Minds	Changed	Society	(Chicago:	School	of	the	Art	Institute	of	Chicago,	2012);	and	Alain	Findeli,	“Design	Education	and	Industry:	The	Laborious	Beginnings	of	Institute	of	Design	in	Chicago,”	Journal	of	Design	History	4:2	(1991):	97-113.	22	See,	Findeli,	“Moholy-Nagy's	Design	Pedagogy	in	Chicago	(1937-46),”	Design	Issues	7:1	(1990):	4-19.	23	Katherine	Reynolds,	“The	Influence	of	John	Dewey	on	Experimental	Colleges:	The	Black	Mountain	Example,”	(paper	presented	at	the	American	Educational	Research	Association	Conference,	April	22,	1995).	24	Findeli,	“Moholy-Nagy's	Design	Pedagogy	in	Chicago	(1937-46).”	25	It	has	also	been	claimed	that	Dewey’s	work	partially	informed	the	development	of	Tomás	Maldonado’s	semiotics	at	the	Ulm	School	in	Germany	in	the	1950s.	See,	Klaus	Krippendorff,	The	Semantic	Turn:	A	New	Foundation	for	Design	(Boca	Raton:	CRC	Press,	2006):	306.	26	See,	Buchanan,	“Thinking	About	Design:	An	Historical	Perspective”,	418.	
present,	with	Dewey’s	theories	of	experience	still	inspiring	much	discussion	among	the	interaction	design	community.27	Given	the	depth	of	Dewey’s	impact	on	design	in	general,	it	is	surprising	how	few	authors	have	directly	explored	the	implications	of	his	broader	philosophy	for	design	research.28	Most	strikingly,	there	has	been	little	investigation	of	his	epistemological	approach—especially	when	considered	against	the	wide	referencing	of	Schön.		It	is	my	belief	that	the	field	has	much	yet	to	gain	from	a	coherent	overview	of	Dewey’s	extensive	body	of	work.	In	particular,	I	wish	to	put	forward	the	argument	that	Dewey	offers	a	more	expansive	approach	to	knowledge	than	can	be	found	in	Schön;	one	which,	if	carefully	examined	and	appropriated,	has	much	to	offer	design	research.	Accordingly,	through	the	remainder	of	this	article	I	aim	to	do	two	things.	Firstly,	to	provide	an	outline	of	Dewey’s	approach	to	knowledge	and,	secondly,	to	highlight	a	number	of	its	features,	which,	I	believe,	hold	the	potential	to	enrich	the	epistemological	basis	of	design	inquiry.	Before	proceeding,	to	avoid	confusion,	a	distinction	must	be	drawn	between	the	concept	of	knowledge	as	it	pertains	to	design	research	and	knowledge	in	the	context	of	individual	acts	of	learning,	i.e.,	the	difference	between	‘it	is	known’	versus	‘I	know’.	The	latter	points	to	personal	endeavour;	while	the	former	implies	that	a	particular	set	of	techniques	and	procedures—recognized	by	a	specific	knowledge	community—have	been	applied,	leading	to	outcomes,	which																																																									27	See,	for	example,	Peter	Wright	and	John	McCarthy,	Technology	as	Experience	(Cambridge	MA:	MIT	Press,	2004);	Erik	Stolterman,	“The	Nature	of	Design	Practice	and	Implications	for	Interaction	Design	Research,”	International	Journal	of	
Design	2:1	(2008):	55-65;	and	Peter	Dalsgaard	and	Christian	Dindler	“Between	Theory	and	Practice:	Bridging	concepts	in	HCI	research,”	in	Proceedings	of	the	SIGCHI	Conference	on	Human	Factors	in	Computing	Systems	(New	York:	ACM,	2014):	1635-1644.	28	For	some	strong	examples	of	those	who	have	see	Buchanan,	“Wicked	Problems	in	Design	Thinking”;	Peter	Dalsgaard,	“Pragmatism	and	Design	Thinking,”	International	Journal	of	Design	8:1	(2014):	143-153;	Melles,	“An	Enlarged	Pragmatist	Inquiry	Paradigm	for	Methodological	Pluralism	in	Academic	Design	Research”;	Gavin	Melles,	“New	Pragmatism	and	the	Vocabulary	and	Metaphors	of	Scholarly	Design	Research,”	Design	Issues	24:4	(2008):	88-101;	and	Leif	E.	Östman,	“A	Pragmatist	Theory	of	Design,”	(PhD	diss.,	Royal	Institute	of	Technology,	Stockholm,	2005).	
advance	the	investigations	of	that	community.	In	highlighting	Dewey’s	epistemological	approach,	then,	I	am	examining	its	applicability	to	the	formal	process	of	knowledge	production	in	design	research,	as	opposed	to	the	work	of	professionals	operating	solely	within	the	domain	of	design	practice.		
	
John	Dewey’s	Pragmatism		Alongside	Charles	Sanders	Peirce	(1839-1914),	William	James	(1842-1910)	and	George	Herbert	Mead	(1863-1931),	John	Dewey’s	(1859-1952)	work	sits	within	the	classical	Pragmatist	tradition;	a	movement	that	coalesces	around	a	series	of	core	concerns	relating	to	knowledge,	meaning,	truth	and	value.	Though	gradually	usurped	by	logical	positivism	in	the	late	1930s,29	numerous	followers	continued	to	pursue	key	Pragmatist	themes	through	the	following	decades	of	twentieth	century.	This	includes	Richard	McKeon,	whose	important	investigations	of	rhetoric	have	been	related	to	the	study	of	design.30	More	recently,	the	Neo-Pragmatism	of	Richard	Rorty31	and	others	has	led	to	a	resurgence	of	interest	in	classical	Pragmatist	philosophy.		In	broad	terms,	Dewey’s	own	unique	Pragmatism	can	be	seen	to	bridge	Peirce’s	critical	and	scientific	interests	with	James’s	concern	for	moral	implications.	Throughout	his	work,	an	almost	constant	focus	is	directed	towards	the	relation	between	science	and	human	value.32	Equally,	underpinned	by	what	
																																																								29	Richard	Bernstein,	The	Pragmatic	Turn	(Malden	MA:	Polity,	2010):	11-12.	30	McKeon	was	a	student	of	Dewey’s	at	Columbia	and	eventually	a	professor	at	the	University	of	Chicago.	Examining	McKeon’s	investigations	of	rhetoric	from	the	perspective	of	design,	Richard	Buchanan	has	identified	a	wealth	of	connections	between	the	two.	See,	Richard	Buchanan,	“Design	and	the	New	Rhetoric:	Productive	Arts	and	the	Philosophy	of	Culture,”	Philosophy	and	Rhetoric	34:3	(2001):	183-206		31	Horace	Standish	Thayer,	Meaning	and	Action:	A	Critical	History	of	Pragmatism	(Indianapolis:	Bobbs	Merrill	Co.,	1968):	165.		32	See,	Richard	Rorty,	Philosophy	and	the	Mirror	of	Nature	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1979).	It	is	important	to	note	that	though	Rorty	champions	Dewey	as	one	of	the	greatest	philosophers	of	the	twentieth	century,	he	has	been	accused	of	misreading	the	work.	It	particular,	a	number	of	critics	find	his	rejection	of	Dewey’s	belief	in	the	possibility	of	social	reconstruction	objectionable.	See,	for	example,	James	Campbell	“Rorty's	Use	of	Dewey,”	The	Southern	Journal	of	
has	been	interpreted	as	a	melioristic	spirit,33	we	find	a	long-term	commitment	to	the	possibility	of	enabling	a	democratic	reconstruction	of	the	social	world.34	Through	this	broad	thematic	reach,	it	is	perhaps	unsurprising	that	his	contributions	extend	across	many	fields,	including	education,	psychology,	sociology,	aesthetics	and	politics.35		While	the	readings	of	Dewey	which	follow	are	my	own,	I	have	been	guided	by	the	work	of	two	leading	scholars,	Ralph	Sleeper	and	Larry	Hickman.	Both	offer	keenly	insightful	perspectives	on	Dewey’s	work,	perceptively	describing	its	core	features,	as	well	as	highlighting	its	contemporary	implications.	Of	the	two,	however,	it	is	Sleeper	who	develops	the	most	compelling	presentation.	On	his	account,	if	we	are	to	understand	Dewey	in	holistic	terms,	we	must	understand	how	his	theory	of	inquiry	relates	to	his	metaphysics	through	a	theory	of	communication.36	This	basic	thesis	guides	the	structure	of	following	sections,	where	my	primary	focus	will	be	directed	towards	two	texts	in	particular:	Logic:	A	
Theory	of	Inquiry	(1938)	and	Experience	and	Nature	(1925).	The	former	presents	what	is	perhaps	Dewey’s	clearest	statement	on	the	subjects	of	inquiry	and	logic,	while	the	latter	may	be	understood	as	a	background	to	this,	setting	out	Dewey’s	metaphysics.	At	the	outset,	it	is	important	to	highlight	that	Dewey’s	philosophy	has	not	avoided	criticism.	In	fact,	there	is	an	entire	volume	compiling	various,	sometimes	
																																																																																																																																																														
Philosophy	22:2	(1984):	175-187;	Ralph	W.	Sleeper,	The	Necessity	of	Pragmatism	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1986);	and	Bernstein,	The	Pragmatic	Turn.		33	Sleeper,	The	Necessity	of	Pragmatism.	34	James	Campbell,	“A	History	of	Pragmatism,”	in	The	Bloomsbury	Companion	to	Pragmatism,	Sami	Pihlström	ed.	(London:	Bloomsbury,	2015).	35	Larry	Hickman,	Foreward	to	Unmodern	Philosophy	and	Modern	Philosophy,	by	John	Dewey,	Philip	Deen	ed.	(Carbondale:	Southern	Illinois	University	Press,	2012):	xiii-xi.	36	Sleeper,	The	Necessity	of	Pragmatism,	6-7.	
high-profile	attacks	and	critiques	mounted	by	his	contemporaries.37	For	the	most	part,	these	focus	on	aspects	of	Dewey’s	metaphysics,	often	questioning	the	extent	to	which	it	can	be	seen	as	a	metaphysics	at	all	or	the	particular	version	of	reality	it	presents.38	Another	area	of	contention	concerns	his	theory	of	inquiry	and	its	relationship	to	formal	logic.39	More	recently,	Rorty—a	champion	of	Dewey	in	general—has	dismissed	his	metaphysics	as	a	mistake.40	Given	the	radical	nature	of	many	of	Dewey’s	proposals,	such	criticisms	are	understandable.	Approaching	the	work	without	prior	orientation,	some	pronouncements	can	appear	ill-conceived	or	misguided,	leading	to	much	confusion	in	the	literature.	However,	as	is	the	frequent	plea	of	Dewey’s	admirers,	slow,	careful	and	systematic	readings	of	the	works,	combined	with	reference	to	the	full	breath	of	available	sources,	can	yield	a	rich	and	rewarding	insight	into	human	action	and	its	potential.	
	
Dewey’s	Theory	of	Inquiry	Though	unique	in	itself,	Dewey’s	theory	of	inquiry	can	be	seen	to	directly	appropriate	a	number	of	core	concepts	drawn	from	Charles	Sanders	Peirce’s	‘doubt-belief’	theory.41	In	this	work,	Peirce	explored	the	role	of	human	psychology	within	the	evolutionary	process.	On	his	view,	in	order	to	survive,	the	human	organism	must	continually	engage	in	cycles	of	moving	from	a	state	of	doubt	to	a	state	of	belief.	When	in	doubt	we	are	‘uneasy	and	dissatisfied’	and,	as	a	
																																																								37	Sidney	Morgenbesser,	ed.	Dewey	and	his	Critics:	Essays	from	the	Journal	of	Philosophy	(Lancaster	PA:	Lancaster	Press,	1977).	38	See,	for	example,	George	Santayana,	“Dewey’s	Naturalistic	Metaphysics”,	in	Dewey	and	his	Critics:	Essays	from	the	
Journal	of	Philosophy,	Sidney	Morgenbesser	ed.	(Lancaster	PA:	Lancaster	Press,	1977):	343-358.	39	See,	for	example,	Bertrand	Russell,	“Professor	Dewey’s	“Essay’s	in	Experimental	Logic,””	in	Dewey	and	his	Critics:	Essays	
from	the	Journal	of	Philosophy,	Sidney	Morgenbesser	ed.	(Lancaster	PA:	Lancaster	Press,	1977):	231-252.	40	Richard	Rorty,	Consequences	of	Pragmatism:	Essays,	1972-1980	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	1982).	41	Thayer,	Meaning	and	Action:	A	Critical	History	of	Pragmatism,	171;	Sleeper,	The	Necessity	of	Pragmatism,	49.	
result,	are	required	to	initiate	‘a	struggle	to	attain	a	state	of	belief’—a	process	that	Peirce	refers	to	as	‘inquiry’.42	Through	his	appropriation,	Dewey	refashioned	Peirce’s	original	theory	into	an	organic,	naturalistic	presentation	of	inquiry,	allowing	it	to	account	for	both	the	emergence	of	the	scientific	method,	as	well	as	formal	logic.43	On	this	reframing,	instead	of	being	understood	as	‘unobservable,	transcendental	and	“intuitional,”’	logic	would	become	empirical	and	observable.44	Though	both	doubt	and	belief	were	retained	as	the	theory’s	start	and	end	points,	knowledge	was	now	positioned	as	inquiry’s	‘product’.45	By	way	of	definition,	Dewey	sets	forth	the	following	statement:		‘Inquiry	is	the	controlled	or	directed	transformation	of	an	indeterminate	situation	into	one	which	is	so	determinate	in	its	constitute	distinctions	and	relations	as	to	convert	the	elements	of	the	original	situation	into	a	unified	whole.’46		 		Dewey	proposed	that,	in	all	cases,	the	process	could	be	observed	to	follow	a	more	or	less	coherent	sequence,	referred	to	as	the	‘pattern	of	inquiry’.	For	Dewey,	this	is	seen	to	begin	when	we	alight	upon	a	questionable	situation.	Such	a	situation	may	be	‘troubled,	ambiguous,	confused,	full	of	conflicting	tendencies,	
																																																								42	Charles	Sanders	Peirce,	The	Essential	Peirce,	Selected	Philosophical	Writings,	Volume	1,	1867-1893,	Nathan	Houser	and	Christian	Kloesel	eds.	(Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press,	1992).	See	in	particular	“The	Fixation	of	Belief”	and	“How	to	Make	Our	Ideas	Clear”.	43	Sleeper,	The	Necessity	of	Pragmatism,	50	44	John	Dewey,	The	Later	Works,	1925-1953,	Vol.	12:	1938,	Jo	Ann	Boydston	ed.	(Carbondale:	Southern	Illinois	University	Press,	1987):	107.	For	Dewey,	logic	is	best	understood	as	emerging	through	our	real	world	interactions;	the	successes	and	failures	of	approaches	to	action	as	we	seek	to	respond	to	the	situations	we	encounter.	Accordingly,	an	appropriate	theory	of	logic	would,	on	his	view,	position	structured	logical	understanding	as	the	outcome	of	competent	inquiry,	which	may	inform	future	inquiries.	In	this	way,	logic	becomes	a	theory	of	inquiry.	45	Ibid.,	15-16.	46	Ibid.,	108.	
obscure’	and	so	on.	Dewey	is	keen	to	stress	that	these	traits	belong	to	the	situation	and	not	to	the	individual	or	group	who	are	initiating	the	inquiry.47		Questioning	directs	us	toward	a	wider	set	of	considerations.	Perhaps	most	significant	among	these	is	the	need	to	set	or,	as	Dewey	has	it,	‘institute’	a	clearly	defined	problem.	This	frames	the	inquiry	and	becomes,	according	to	Dewey,	‘the	criterion’	from	which	the	‘relevancy	and	irrelevancy	of	hypotheses	and	conceptual	structures’	are	to	be	judged.	From	here,	solutions	may	be	conceived	and	evaluated.	However,	progress	towards	a	solution	presents	a	number	of	challenges.		In	outlining	the	process,	Dewey	binds	together	a	series	of	interrelated	intellectual	and	practical	activities	that	are	seen	to	lead	eventually	to	the	close	of	inquiry.	As	an	initial	step,	in	order	to	identify	a	valid	problem,	we	must	first	attend	to	the	immediate	existential	facts	of	the	situation.48	Against	these,	solutions	may	‘flash	upon	us,	occur	to	us’	in	the	form	of	suggestions	or	possibilities.	Suggestions	and	possibilities	will	evolve	into	ideas	as	we	examine	their	‘functional	fitness’	and	their	‘capacity	as	a	means	of	resolving	the	given	situation’.49	Here,	they	become	‘anticipated	consequences	(forecasts)	of	what	will	happen	when	certain	operations	are	executed	under	and	with	respect	to	observed	conditions’.50	Following	on	from	this,	once	an	idea	is	formed,	its	‘meaning	contents’	must	be	considered	in	relation	to	the	inquiry	as	a	whole.	According	to	Dewey,	this	occurs	through	a	process	of	reasoning	wherein	the	consequences	of	selecting	a	given	meaning	are	checked	against	its	impact	on	the	
																																																								47	Ibid.,	109.		48	Ibid.,	112-113.	By	way	of	example,	Dewey	considers	the	sounding	of	a	fire	alarm.	There	is	much	that	we	will	be	able	to	identify	as	fact,	such	as	the	likely	presence	of	a	fire,	the	position	of	the	exits,	and	the	behaviour	of	others.	Such	material	is	said	to	‘constitute	the	terms	of	the	problem’,	which	must	be	taken	into	account	if	we	are	to	arrive	at	a	relevant	solution.	49	Ibid.,	113-114.	50	Ibid.,	113.	
system	of	meanings	that	have	been	developed	within	the	course	of	the	inquiry.	This	is	likely	to	result	in	an	idea’s	modification	as	it	is	transformed	through	gradual	iteration,	becoming	‘more	clearly	relevant	to	the	problem	at	hand’.51	Underpinning	the	above	stages	is	Dewey’s	belief	that	inquiry	is	carried	forward	and	ultimately	brought	to	a	close	through	the	constant	operational	interaction	of	facts	(i.e.,	existential	material)	with	ideas	(i.e.,	non-existential	material).	Facts	lead	to	ideas;	ideas	lead	to	experiments	or	other	‘operations	of	observation’	wherein	further	facts	may	be	gathered.52	The	overall	cycle	relies	on	the	productive	application	of	both.	Interestingly,	apart	from	the	stipulation	that	indeterminate	situations	must	become	increasingly	determinate,	we	are	not	offered	a	clear	insight	into	the	endpoint	or	closure	of	inquiry.	This	may	be	due	to	Dewey’s	insistence	that	no	inquiry	is	final	in	and	of	itself.	Indeed,	no	set	of	conclusions,	he	argues,	can	avoid	the	possibility	of	future	revision	or	adaption.53	Thus,	rather	than	define	the	process	of	closure,	Dewey	invokes	the	concept	of	attaining	knowledge	as	the	means	by	which	inquiry	is	settled.	Here,	we	are	told:			‘That	which	satisfactorily	terminates	inquiry	is,	by	definition,	knowledge;	it	is	knowledge	because	it	is	the	appropriate	close	of	inquiry.’54		 	Use	of	the	words	‘satisfactorily’	and	‘appropriate’	here	imply	that,	at	the	end	of	an	inquiry,	a	pre-existing	set	of	aims	or	objectives	will	have	been	fulfilled	or	at																																																									51	Ibid.,	115.	52	Ibid.,	116.	53	Ibid.,	16.	Dewey	presents	this	as	follows:	‘[…]	inquiry	is	a	continuing	process	in	every	field	with	which	it	is	engaged.	The	“settlement”	of	a	particular	situation	by	a	particular	inquiry	is	no	guarantee	that	that	settled	conclusion	will	always	remain	settled.	The	attainment	of	beliefs	is	a	progressive	matter;	there	is	no	belief	so	settled	as	to	not	be	exposed	to	further	inquiry.’	54	Ibid.,	15.	
least	approached.	What	we	are	left	with	is	‘an	object	of	knowledge’;	that	is,	a	known	object,	which	may	guide	and	inform	further	inquiry.		Sensibly,	against	this	latter	stance,	Dewey	avoids	of	any	discussion	of	‘truth’	as	a	strictly	defined	concept	relating	to	a	correspondence	with	reality.	Indeed,	the	possibility	of	final	and	absolute	access	to	truth	would	inevitably	conflict	with	an	understanding	of	inquiry	as	a	‘continuing	process.’	By	way	of	alternative,	the	notion	of	‘warranted	assertibility’	is	introduced.	Though	less	crisp	a	term	than	truth,55	warranted	assertibility	offers	a	flexible	approach	to	the	concept	of	validity	within	the	conduct	of	inquiry.	Specifically,	it	refers	to	the	presentation	of	a	set	of	reasonable	conclusions,	which	are	seen	to	arise	out	of	competent	practice56	and	hold	clear	applicability	to	the	conduct	of	future	inquiries.57	As	such,	value	is	recognized	at	the	same	time	as	allowing	for	future	revision.	From	the	above	outline,	it	will	be	apparent	that	the	pattern	focuses	on	the	activities	that	direct	inquiry	rather	than	its	abstract	underpinnings.	As	Morgenbesser	puts	it,	Dewey	very	much	saw	inquiry	as	a	‘species	of	action’58	and	not	a	purely	intellectual	pursuit.	To	be	sure,	on	the	Deweyan	understanding,	it	is	a	species	of	action	that	is	firmly	located	in	ordinary	life.	Indeed,	Dewey	went	so	far	as	to	claim	that	his	pattern	of	inquiry	was	as	applicable	to	everyday	‘common	sense’	inquiries	as	to	scientific	endeavour.	In	fact,	the	two	are	seen	as	linked,	with	common	sense	inquiry	attending	to	issues	of	‘use	and	enjoyment’	in	holistic	real-world	situations	and	science	aiming	to	abstract	from	this,	resulting	in	contingent	knowledge.	Returned	to	everyday	experience,	such	knowledge	is	said	to	refine,	expand	and	liberate	the	‘contents	of	and	the	agencies	at	the	disposal	of																																																									55	Sleeper,	The	Necessity	of	Pragmatism,	134.	56	Dewey,	The	Later	Works,	1925-1953,	Vol.	12:	1938,	108.	57	Ibid.,	120.	58	Morgenbesser,	Dewey	and	his	Critics:	Essays	from	the	Journal	of	Philosophy,	xxiv.	
common	sense’.59	Consequently,	though	common	sense	and	science	differ	in	the	
types	of	problems	they	examine,	they	are	not	viewed	as	metaphysically	or	ontological	different.60	To	a	large	degree,	this	linking	of	common	sense	and	science	relies	on	Dewey’s	proposal	that	two	broad	‘existential’	matrices,	one	biological	and	the	other	cultural,	necessarily	frame	and	advance	inquiry.	Biologically,	the	human	organism	is	considered	in	strictly	functional	terms,	relating	to	our	sensory,	motor,	and	nervous	systems.61	Culturally,	however,	the	relevant	social	factors	are	drawn	into	focus,	with	a	particular	emphasis	being	placed	on	language	and	its	consequences.62	Here,	we	encounter	Dewey’s	theory	of	communication.		
	
Dewey’s	Theory	of	Communication	For	Dewey,	human	communication	is	manifest	not	only	in	speech	and	writing	but	also,	more	expansively,	in	all	modes	of	art	and	music.63	Accounts	detailing	the	process	of	communication	and	its	consequences	appear	throughout	his	works.64	Among	these,	perhaps	the	sharpest	outline	may	be	seen	to	form	the	central	pivot	of	Experience	and	Nature.	In	this	text	Dewey	sets	out	to	challenge	traditional	conceptions	of	the	relationship	between	the	‘external’	world	and	the	human	mind.	On	his	reconfiguration,	communication,	or	more	specifically	language,	is	presented	as	a	‘naturalistic	link’	between	the	physical	world	and	what	is	generally	thought	of	as	the	ideal.65	Indeed,	for	Dewey,	it	is	the	material-
																																																								59	Dewey,	The	Later	Works,	1925-1953,	Vol.	12:	1938,	71-72.		60	Larry	Hickman,	Pragmatism	as	Post-Postmodernism:	Lessons	from	John	Dewey	(New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	2007):	212.	61	Dewey,	The	Later	Works,	1925-1953,	Vol.	12:	1938,	30.	62	Ibid.,	48-49.	63	Larry	Hickman,	Philosophical	Tools	for	Technological	Culture:	Putting	Pragmatism	to	Work	(Bloomington,	IN:	Indiana	University	Press,	2001):	46-47.	64	The	particular	titles	I	have	in	mind	include	Experience	and	Nature,	Art	as	Experience	and	Logic:	The	Theory	of	Inquiry.		65	John	Dewey,	Experience	and	Nature	(1929;	rpt.	New	York:	Dover	Publications	Inc.,	1958):	xiii.	
intellectual	interactions	that	occur	in	language,	which	have	led	to	there	being	any	concept	of	the	ideal	or	spiritual	to	begin	with.66	His	argument	advances	from	the	view	that	communication	may	be	understood	to	be	both	‘consummatory	as	well	as	instrumental’.67	Consummatory	because	our	immediate	experiences	are	enhanced	as	we	enjoy	the	consequences	of	exchange	and	understanding.	Instrumental	because,	through	communication	and	language,	we	are	able	to	establish	cooperation	within	a	joint	activity.68	Following	on	from	this,	we	are	said	to	gradually	develop	shared	meanings	concerning	the	foreseen	consequences	of	the	activities	we	undertake	in	partnership.	The	development	of	such	shared	meanings	amounts	to	a	gradual	consolidation	of	the	relationships	between	persons,	things	and	consequences.	Over	time,	‘pronounced	instances	of	meaning’	may	be	formed,	which,	in	turn,	are	said	to	constitute	the	‘essence’	of	particular	relationships	within	given	cultures.69	While	this	process	of	consolidating	meaning	is	seen	as	one	of	the	primary	long-term	outcomes	of	communication,	Dewey	goes	on	to	say	that	such	meanings	are	not	applied	restrictively.	Rather,	he	claims,	meanings	are	continually	being	experimented	with.	In	communication	we	often	stretch	them,	testing	whether	or	not	they	may	be	profitably	transferred	to	any	novel	cases	we	might	encounter.70	Such	testing	is	seen	to	form	the	basis	of	new	thinking.		‘Meaning,	fixed	as	essence	in	a	term	of	discourse,	may	be	imaginatively	administered	and	manipulated,	experimented	with.	Just	as	we	overtly	
																																																								66	Ibid.,	171.	67	Ibid.,	202.	68	Ibid.,	179.	69	Ibid.,	182.	70	Ibid.,	188.	
manipulate	things,	making	new	separations	and	combinations,	thereby	introducing	things	into	new	contexts	and	environments	[…]’71		 For	Ralph	Sleeper,	such	statements	indicate	an	understanding	of	communication	as	transformational.72	In	other	words,	following	Dewey’s	argument,	communication	may	be	seen	as	a	process	through	which	our	conceptualizations	of	the	relationships	between	of	persons,	things	and	consequences	may	be	redirected	and	altered.	Sleeper	goes	on	to	suggest	that,	in	the	Deweyan	approach,	the	way	we	view	existence	itself	may	be	seen	as	undergoing	continual	transformation	through	communication.	This	links	us	at	last	to	Dewey’s	own	particular	brand	of	metaphysics.	
	
Dewey’s	Metaphysics	Metaphysics	has	traditionally	been	presented	as	the	study	of	what	exists,	examining	in	particular	the	properties	of	existent	things,	their	relationships,	as	well	as	the	structure	of	reality	as	a	whole.	While	many	metaphysical	conclusions	are	at	least	partly	based	on	direct	empirical	evidence,	‘hunches	and	intuitions	of	truth’	are	also	permissible	when	‘secure	knowledge	is	unavailable’.73	From	the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century,	Dewey	had	been	questioning	the	extent	to	which	this	classical	framing	could	be	sustained.74	In	Experience	and	Nature	(1925)	he	proposed	a	full-scale	reconstruction	of	the	discipline.	
																																																								71	Ibid.,	194.	72	Sleeper,	The	Necessity	of	Pragmatism,	120.	73	Robert	C.	Koons	and	Timothy	Pickavance,	Metaphysics:	The	Fundamentals	(London:	John	Wiley	&	Sons,	2015):	2.	74	John	Dewey,	“The	Subject	Matter	of	Metaphysical	Inquiry”,	in	Dewey	and	his	Critics:	Essays	from	the	Journal	of	
Philosophy,	Sidney	Morgenbesser	ed.	(Lancaster	PA:	Lancaster	Press,	1977):	317.	In	‘The	Subject-Matter	of	Metaphysical	Inquiry’	Dewey	presented	an	initial	proposal	outlining	a	revised	role	for	the	discipline.	Through	reformation,	he	argued,	metaphysics	could	become	a	science	focused	on	the	identification	and	articulation	of	‘the	ultimate	traits	of	the	world’	It	would	be	concerned	not	with	specifics,	as	is	the	case	in	the	natural	sciences	for	example,	but	instead	with	the	generalities	of	existence.		
The	text	opens	with	the	argument	that	experience	and	nature	should	not	be	seen	as	separate.	Experience,	we	are	told,	is	‘of	nature	as	well	as	in	nature’.75	It	is	through	experience	that	we	encounter	a	world,	which	is	anything	but	‘sure,	regular	and	finished’.	Rather,	the	world	we	come	to	know	in	daily	life	is	a	blend	of	‘sufficiencies,	tight	completeness,	order’	and	‘recurrences’,	as	well	as	‘singularities,	ambiguities,’	and	‘uncertain	processes’.76	Against	this	complexity,	existence	is	said	to	be	comprised	of	events.77	On	Dewey’s	account,	events	draw	together	human	life	in	an	unbounded	completeness,	weaving	the	personal,	the	social	and	the	material	into	one	complex	interaction.	As	was	highlighted	in	the	previous	section,	Dewey	believes	that	it	is	through	social	discourse	that	we	are	able	to	identify	and	articulate	the	meaning	of	things,	to	draw	them	into	focus,	as	well	as	to	expand	upon	them.	Further	to	this,	in	events,	language	is	said	to	allow	us	to	convert	felt	qualities	into	the	‘objective	differences’	between	things.	Feelings	come	to	make	sense.	We	can	identify	and	discriminate	between	‘pains,	pleasures,	odors,	colors,	noises,	tones’.78	As	such	qualities	are	seen	to	arise	through	‘the	complex	and	extensive	interaction	of	events’,	Dewey	insists	that	they	must	be	understood	as	holding	a	‘natural	existential	status’.79	In	other	words,	he	believes	that	they	belong	as	much	to	the	situation	as	to	the	individual.	In	holding	a	natural	existential	status,	qualities	are	presented	as	the	‘ends,	terminals,	arrests,	enclosures’	of	nature.	On	this	view,	nature	may	be	seen	as	‘an	affair	of	affairs’;	a	linked	up	set	of	ends	and	beginnings	which	each	hold	qualities.80	
																																																								75	Dewey,	Experience	and	Nature,	4a.	76	Ibid.,	47.	77	Ibid.,	71	78	Ibid.,	258-259	79	Ibid.,	265.	80	Ibid.,	96.	
The	text	concludes	with	an	exploration	of	the	relationship	between	existence,	values	and	philosophy.	We	are	told	that	‘natural	ends’	necessarily	present	intrinsic,	immediately	recognizable	values.81	In	light	of	this,	Dewey	believes	that,	were	it	appropriately	contextualized,	philosophy	would	become	‘a	method	of	discriminating	among	goods	on	the	basis	of	the	conditions	of	their	appearance	and	of	their	consequences’;82	that	is,	a	method	of	criticism	or	‘a	criticism	of	criticisms’.	This	method,	when	properly	pursued	as	a	means	of	inquiry,	would	result	in	the	institution	and	perpetuation	of	‘more	enduring	and	extensive	values’.83	Following	on	from	this	proposed	redirection	of	philosophy	and	the	preceding	theory	of	existence,	a	reconstructed	metaphysics	would	aim,	we	are	told,	towards	‘a	statement	of	the	generic	traits	manifested	by	existences	of	all	kinds	without	regard	to	their	differentiation	between	the	physical	and	the	mental’.	These	would	likely	include:	‘qualitative	individuality	and	constant	relations,	contingency	and	need,	movement	and	arrest’.	While	the	identification	of	such	traits	would	never	be	final,	they	would	begin	to	provide	philosophy	with	a	‘ground	map’,	guiding	criticism	towards	‘more	intricate	triangulations’	in	its	investigation	of	values.84	
	
A	Deweyan	Framework	for	Knowledge	
																																																								81	Ibid.,	396.	To	trace	some	of	Dewey’s	examples,	in	our	natural	experience	qualities	such	as	poignancy,	humour,	zest,	tragedy	and	beauty	are	all	implicitly	approached	in	terms	their	being	‘fugitive	and	precarious,	positive	and	negative’	and	‘indefinitely	diversified’.	82	Ibid.,	396.	83	Ibid.,	403.	84	Ibid.,	412-413.	
It	is	often	noted	that	Dewey	never	developed	a	formal	epistemological	theory,	at	least	not	in	the	traditional	sense.85	By	way	of	alternative,	some	suggest	that	his	theory	of	inquiry	may	be	seen	to	function	as	a	stand-in,	i.e.,	fulfilling	a	similar	role.86	To	a	degree,	this	is	true,	however,	as	was	alluded	to	earlier,	Ralph	Sleeper	presents	a	compelling	argument	in	favour	of	seeing	Dewey’s	approach	to	knowledge	as	being	distributed	across	the	three	theories	outlined	above.		At	the	outset,	Sleeper	centralizes	the	theory	of	inquiry	and	highlights	how,	as	an	approach	to	understanding	logic,	it	should	be	seen	as	taking	experience	as	it	subject	matter.	Following	on	from	John	McDermot,	he	argues	that,	from	Dewey’s	perspective,	experience	is	to	be	understood	as	‘pedagogical’;	it	teaches	and,	through	reflection,	we	learn.87	By	reflecting	on	our	experiences	in	the	experimental	settings	of	both	common	sense	and	scientific	inquiry	we	are	able	to	arrive	at	objects	of	knowledge	or,	to	put	it	in	clearer	terms,	known	objects.	This	is	key;	for	when	unknown	objects	are	transformed	into	known	objects	we	inevitably	transform	our	understanding	of	their	placement	in	the	world,	which,	consequently,	is	itself	transformed.	As	Sleeper	states:		‘The	thing	is	not	merely	seen	differently	as	a	result	of	inquiry,	nor	is	the	difference	merely	the	effect	of	causal	factors	present	in	the	operations	of	inquiry,	which	intervene	between	the	non-cognitive	object	and	the	object	as	known.	For	the	object,	by	being	placed	in	wholly	new	relationships	becomes	a	
																																																								85	Hickman,	Philosophical	Tools	for	Technological	Culture:	Putting	Pragmatism	to	Work;	John	R.	Shook,	Dewey’s	Empirical	
Theory	of	Knowledge	and	Reality	(Nashville:	Vanderbilt	University	Press,	2000);	Sleeper,	The	Necessity	of	Pragmatism;	George	Dykhuizen,	The	Life	and	Mind	of	John	Dewey	(Carbondale:	Southern	Illinois	University	Press,	1973).	86	Hickman,	Pragmatism	as	Post-Postmodernism:	Lessons	from	John	Dewey,	206	87	Sleeper,	The	Necessity	of	Pragmatism,	6.	
different	object.	The	transaction	that	takes	place	in	inquiry	reconstructs	the	object	by	reconstructing	its	relations.’88		From	the	above,	we	connect	to	Dewey’s	metaphysics.	For	Sleeper,	this	functions	as	a	background	theory	to	the	whole.	Through	it,	experience	is	connected	to	nature,	mind	to	body,	thought	to	action,	communication	to	the	things	of	the	world	and	consequences	to	value.	There	is	no	longer	any	awkward,	imposed	disjunctions	or	arbitrary	separations	between	the	world	and	our	full	physical	and	intellectual	participation	within	it.	In	the	simplest	terms,	inquiry	as	a	natural	process	gives	us	access	to	nature.	To	restate	this	more	fully,	we	apply	intelligence	and	reflection—which	are	seen	as	natural—as	we	inquire	and,	broadly,	through	inquiry,	we	gradually	come	to	understand	the	structures	of	existence	such	that	we	can	offer	adequate	criticism	on	subjects	of	belief,	conduct	and	appreciation.	The	wholeness	of	this	arrangement,	Sleeper	believes,	relies	on	Dewey’s	theory	of	communication,	which	he	argues	connects	the	theory	of	inquiry	to	the	theory	of	existence.	On	this	view,	language	allows	us	to	establish	a	relationship	between	things	in	experience	and	things	in	existence.89	In	other	words,	by	bundling	the	people,	things,	and	consequences	of	inquiry	together	as	meanings,	language	also	carries	our	ontological	understandings	forward.	It	is	the	tool	that	allows	us	to	project	from	experience	to	an	understanding	of	existence.		
	
	 	
																																																								88	Ibid.,	121.	89	Ibid.,	116.	
An	Enrichment	of	Design	Research		In	recent	years,	Richard	Buchanan	and	others90	have	drawn	links	between	Dewey’s	theory	of	inquiry	and	design	research.	Through	Sleeper’s	investigation,	the	possible	relevancy	of	the	theory	is	extended	further.	Specifically,	the	Deweyan	framework	he	reveals—linking,	as	it	does,	people,	things	and	consequences	in	relation	to	knowledge—	points	to	the	possibility	of	a	strengthened	epistemological	narrative	for	research	which	incorporates	design	practice.	Examining	this	framework	in	detail,	it	is	possible	to	identify	a	number	of	features,	which,	taken	collectively,	begin	to	scaffold	such	a	narrative.	The	first	feature	is	Dewey’s	explicit	naturalization	of	thought,	ideas,	meanings	and	imagination,	as	supported	by	his	theorization	of	a	‘biosociocultural	continuity’91	within	the	metaphysics.	On	this	view,	thought,	ideas	and	meanings	are	not	understood	in	opposition	to	nature	but,	rather,	are	of	nature,	arising	in	action.	As	such,	the	creativity	of	designers	and	other	professionals	is	no	longer	an	anomalous,	extra-natural	occurrence	but	rather	a	finely	honed	ability	to	move	between	problems	and	solutions,	solutions	and	problems	in	the	real	world;	an	outcome	of	an	experimentation	with	meanings	in	discourse	and,	equally,	a	necessary	process	at	play	within	inquiry.		The	second	feature	concerns	Dewey’s	identification	of	two	types	of	inquiry—common	sense	and	scientific.	The	two	are	distinguished	in	terms	of	their	subject	matter	and	priorities	but	not	their	basic	logic	or	metaphysical	standing	and,	as	such,	are	seen	as	related	along	a	continuum.	A	parallel	can	be	
																																																								90	See,	for	example,	Buchanan,	“Thinking	About	Design:	An	Historical	Perspective”;	Buchanan,	“Strategies	of	Design	Research:	Productive	Science	and	Rhetorical	Inquiry”;	Leif	E.	Östman,	“A	Pragmatist	Theory	of	Design”;	and	Peter	Dalsgaard	“Designing	Engaging	Interactive	Environments:	A	Pragmatist	Perspective."	(Aarhus,	Denmark:	Aarhus	University,	2009).	91	Raymond	Boisvert,	John	Dewey:	Rethinking	our	Time	(Albany:	State	University	of	New	York	Press,	1998):	127.	
drawn	here	between	design	practice	and	design	research.92	Both	have	specific	aims	and	priorities	(e.g.,	the	development	and	delivery	of	products,	services	and	experiences,	versus	the	production	of	knowledge)	but	they	are	not	logically	different.	In	each	case	the	inquirers—one	a	designer,	the	other	a	design-researcher—move	from	indeterminacy	to	situations	that	are	increasingly	determined.	From	this	perspective,	the	incorporation	of	design	within	a	research	project	is	unproblematic.	Indeed,	it	may	even	be	necessary	or	desirable.93		The	third	feature	of	note	is	Dewey’s	concept	of	warranted	assertibility.	Here,	workable,	viable	(objects	of)	knowledge	are	valued	for	their	applicability	to	future	inquiries,	as	opposed	to	any	supposed	correspondence	to	an	ultimate	reality.94	The	relevance	of	this	feature	for	design	research	has	been	highlighted	by	a	number	of	authors.95	It	is	found	to	be	a	particularly	compelling	concept	as	it	suggests	that	competency,	contextual	appropriateness	and	transferability96	can	legitimately	underscore	an	inquiry’s	conclusions.		This	links	to	the	final	and	perhaps	most	significant	feature	of	the	framework	relating	to	the	claim	put	forward	by	Sleeper	that	Dewey	sees	inquiry	as	a	process																																																									92	Richard	Buchanan	has	related	Schön’s	approach	to	Dewey’s	concept	of	common	sense	inquiry.	See	Buchanan,	“Strategies	of	Design	Research:	Productive	Rhetorical	Inquiry”,	63.	93	Dewey	believed	that	the	findings	of	science	should,	as	a	matter	of	course,	be	returned	to	the	world	of	common	sense.	However,	he	was	not	convinced	that	this	was	routinely	achieved.	Though	much	has	changed	since	Dewey’s	time,	design	research	can,	arguably,	be	said	to	present	a	means	by	which	links	may	be	forged	between	the	two	domains.	Indeed,	in	the	late	1990s	Buchanan	proposed	that	doctoral	education	in	design	might	be	based	on	a	‘neoteric’	approach	to	education	that	‘gather[s]	resources	from	any	area	of	previous	learning	in	order	to	find	new	ways	of	addressing	the	new	problems,	thereby	creating	a	new	body	of	learning	and	knowledge.’	See,	Richard	Buchanan,	“The	Study	of	Design:	Doctoral	Education	and	Research	in	a	New	Field	of	Inquiry,”	in	Doctoral	Education	in	Design	1998:	Proceedings	of	the	Ohio	
Conference,	October	8–11,	1998;	and	Richard	Buchanan,	“Design	research	and	the	new	learning,”	Design	Issues	17:4	(2001):	3-23.	94	For	philosopher	Larry	Hickman,	the	fallibilism	inherent	in	this	concept	contributes	to	what	he	terms	a	‘post-postmodern’	character	in	Dewey’s	work.	According	to	Hickman,	this	emerges	in	Dewey’s	effective	rejection	of	the	central	claims	of	modernist	thought	(e.g.,	dualism	of	mind	and	body;	that	certain	knowledge	is	attainable)	but	also	his	avoidance	of	the	subsequent	excesses	of	post-modernism	(e.g.,	that	no	one	viewpoint	can	be	privileged	over	any	other).	As	such,	Dewey	is	seen	to	have	anticipated	postmodernist	arguments	at	the	same	time	as	avoided	some	of	the	movement’s	more	negative	conclusions.	See	Hickman,	Postmodernism:	Lessons	from	John	Dewey.	95	See,	for	example,	Stolterman,	“The	nature	of	Design	Practice	and	Implications	for	Interaction	Design	Research”;	and	Wolfgang	Jonas,	“Design	Research	and	its	Meaning	to	the	Methodological	Development	of	the	Discipline,”	in	Design	
Research	Now,	187-206.	96	There	is	a	parallel	here	with	the	constructionist	evaluation	criteria	of	credibility,	transferability,	dependability	and	conformability	first	proposed	by	Lincoln	and	Guba.	See	Yvonna	S.	Lincoln	and	Egon	G.	Guba,	Naturalistic	Inquiry	(Newbury	Park,	CA:	Sage	Publications,	1986).	For	a	discussion	of	possible	evaluation	criteria	for	research	through	design	in	the	context	of	HCI	see	John	Zimmerman,	Jodi	Forlizzi,	and	Shelley	Evenson,	“Research	Through	Design	as	a	Method	for	Interaction	Design	Research	in	HCI,”	in	Proceedings	of	the	SIGCHI	Conference	on	Human	Factors	in	Computing	Systems	(New	York:	ACM,	2007):	493-502.	
of	ontological	transformation.	On	this	account,	the	inquirer	works	to	convert	unknown	objects	into	known	objects	and,	so,	reconstructs	these	entities	along	with	the	wider	network	of	relations	they	sustain.	Arguably,	design	inquiries	can	be	seen	to	go	further	in	that	novel	things	may	be	developed	and	deployed	in	social	situations,	leading	to	novel	consequences.	People,	things	and	consequences	are	then	drawn	together	in	new	ways,	resulting	in	new	meanings	and	wholly	new	sets	of	relations.	From	this	perspective,	design	inquiries	not	only	transform	things	encountered,	but	also	the	range	of	things,	consequences	and	meanings	available	to	encounter.		This	strategy	has	been	widely	explored	in	design	research.	For	example,	Dunne	and	Raby’s	critical	design97	and	Walker’s	development	of	propositional	objects98	can	be	seen	to	include	the	active	interrogation	of	ontological	themes	as	a	function	of	inquiry.	In	both	cases,	scenarios	and	artefacts	are	designed	with	the	explicit	aim	of	questioning	assumptions	and	expanding	possibilities.	Further	parallels	can	be	found	in	the	work	of	Krippendorff	and	Verganti,	who	both	investigate	design’s	relationship	with	meaning.	For	Krippendorff,	design	is	a	process	which	disrupts	present	stabilities;99	‘meaning’,	he	claims,	is	constituted	in	the	use	of	its	outcomes.100	Similarly,	Verganti	argues	that,	through	‘in-depth	explorations	of	the	evolution	of	society,	culture	and	technology’,	designers	are	capable	of	radically	innovating	product	meanings.101			
																																																								97	Antony	Dunne	and	Fiona	Raby.	Design	Noir:	The	Secret	Life	of	Electronic	Objects	(Basel:	Birkhser,	2001);	Antony	Dunne	and	Fiona	Raby.	Speculative	Everything:	Design,	Fiction,	and	Social	Dreaming	(Cambridge	MA:	MIT	Press,	2013).	98	Stuart	Walker,	Designing	for	Sustainability:	Making	Radical	Changes	in	a	Material	World	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2014).	99	Krippendorff,	The	Semantic	Turn:	A	New	Foundation	for	Design,	210.	100	In	formulating	his	semantic	theory	of	design,	Krippendorff	draws	heavily	on	the	work	of	Wittgenstein.	In	particular,	he	focuses	on	Wittgenstein’s	‘meaning	in	use’	concept.	Though	this	is	not	a	Deweyan	perspective,	the	two	views	are	not	necessarily	incompatible.	See	Stephen	Toulmin,	Introduction	to	The	Quest	for	Certainty,	The	Later	Works,	1925-1953:	
1929,	Vol.	4,	by	John	Dewey,	Jo	Ann	Boydston	ed.	(Carbondale:	Southern	Illinois	University	Press,	1984):	vii-xxii.	101	Verganti,	Design	Driven	Innovation	(Boston:	Harvard	Business	School	Publishing,	2009):	xi.		
Lining	up	the	features	in	sequence,	then,	naturalized	creative	thought	is	linked	to	the	conduct	of	design	inquiry—in	both	its	practical	and	academic	forms—which,	in	turn,	is	linked	to	an	understanding	of	knowledge	as	contingent	and	ontologically	transformative.	Taken	as	a	whole,	this	arrangement	begins	to	trace	an	outline	of	an	epistemological	narrative	for	design	research	that	draws	it	into	an	explicit	relationship	with	design	practice.	Set	next	to	one	another,	both	are	seen	to	share	a	basic	logic	and,	yet,	at	the	same	time,	both	retain	a	particular,	specific	set	of	aims	and	priorities—with	design	research	focusing	exclusively	on	knowledge	production.	Following	Dewey’s	lead,	we	can	now	come	to	recognize	that	as	unknown	becomes	known	(and	the	unmade	is	made),	there	emerges	the	potential	to	bring	about	a	deep	and	profound	reorientation	of	our	ontological	parameters.	Further,	it	becomes	the	broader	task	of	the	design	research	community	to	begin	to	critically	articulate	the	extent	to	which	particular	appearances	and	consequences—as	represented	in	its	discourse	relating	people	to	things—contribute	to	the	institution	and	perpetuation	of	‘more	enduring	and	extensive’	values.			 		
	
	
 
 	
